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Abstract 
We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulation and 
equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combining a job matching 
model with monopolistic competition in the goods market and individual bargaining. We 
calibrate the model to US data and perform a policy experiment to assess whether the 
decrease in trend unemployment during the 1980’s and 1990’s could be directly attributed to 
product market deregulation. Under a traditional calibration, our results suggest that a 
decrease of less than two-tenths of a percentage point of unemployment rates can be 
attributed to product market deregulation, a surprisingly small amount. Under a small surplus 
calibration, however, product market deregulation can account for the entire decline in US 
trend unemployment over the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of product market deregulation on labor markets, with spe-
cial emphasis on the Carter/Reagan deregulation of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.
There has been quite some interest recently in the impact of product market institutions
on labormarkets. However, the focus of this literature has been to use differences in US and
European product market regulation to try to explain the divergent performance of US and
European labor markets over the 1980’s and 1990’s. One obstacle faced by this literature
is that the presence of a multitude of rigidities (and attempts at reform) in European labor
markets makes it difficult to disentangle the roles of product and labor market institutions
in accounting for high European unemployment rates. In contrast, the US labor market
is both highly flexible and its institutions were more stable during the period of interest
(Figure 2). This allows us to focus only on changes in product market regulation, while
holding labor market institutions constant.
Consider the graph of HP-trend unemployment rates1 in Figure 1. US unemployment
rates began trending downward in the early 1980’s, falling from a peak of 7.6% in 1982 to
only 5.0% in 2000. The deregulation of US product markets runs parallel to this decrease in
unemployment, as shown by the OECD data on product market regulation plotted in Fig-
ure 1. This, together with the fact that deregulation took place around the time of the trend
reversal in unemployment, makes it worth investigating whether product market deregu-
lation could explain what has widely been termed the ’employment miracle’ (Krueger and
Pischke, 1997)2.
Indeed, there is some amount of empirical evidence to support the link between prod-
uct markets and labor markets. At a micro level, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) examine
the impact of French legislation3 which regulated entry into retailing. They find that those
regions (departements) which restricted entry more strongly experienced slower rates of
job growth. At the cross-country macro level, Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000), using
an OECD index of the degree of product market regulation, also report a negative rela-
tionship between their countrywide regulation measure and employment. Fonseca, et. al.
(2001) show that their index of entry barriers is negatively correlated with employment
and positively correlated with unemployment rates. However, the high degree of correla-
tion between labor and product market regulation documented in Nicoletti, Scarpetta and
Boylaud (2000) makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of each type of regulation in a
cross-country setup.
The main contributions of this paper are both quantitative and theoretical. Our main
quantitative contribution is to quantify the effect of product market deregulation on unem-
1We emphasize that these are trend unemployment rates, whose business cycle component has been filtered
out.
2At the same time, the major change in US labor market institutions - the 1996 welfare reform - took place
after most of the gains in unemployment had already been realized. Unemployment in 1996 had already fallen to
5.4%. In fact, one might argue that the immediate transitory effect of welfare reform should have been to increase
unemployment, as welfare recipients were pushed into the labor market.
3Loi Royer of 1974
1
ployment. We find that whether product market deregulation is able to account for the de-
cline in trend US unemployment in the 1980’s and 1990’s depends crucially on the method
of calibration employed. Using a traditional calibration, along the lines of Shimer (2005),
we find that increasing product market regulation from 1998 to 1978 levels can account for
only a surprisingly small increase in unemployment of less than two-tenths of a percent-
age point, from 5.10% in 1998 to 5.26% in 1978. Using a small surplus calibration similar to
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), however, we find that decreased product market regula-
tion between 1978 and 1998 can account for the entire decline in trend unemployment in
the United States from 7.2% in 1978 to 5.1 % in 1998.
In addition, we also examine alternative explanations for the drop in unemployment,
namely tax reform and a decline worker’s bargaining power. We do this by allowing
for both product market deregulation and tax reform or a decline in worker’s bargain-
ing power. We find that our result that product market deregulation is unable to account
for most of the decline in unemployment is robust to the inclusion of both tax reform and
declining worker’s bargaining power. In order to account for the full 2.1 percentage point
decline in trend unemployment, product markets would need to be deregulated and labor
taxes would have had to decrease from 56.6% in 1978 to 32.0% in 1998. In this case, the
product market deregulation would have accounted for less than one-fifth of the decline
in unemployment. Alternatively, product market deregulation combined with a decline
in worker’s bargaining power from 66.6% in 1978 to 50% in 1998 could generate the drop
in unemployment from 7.2% to 5.1%. However, product market deregulation would only
account for only about one-tenth of the drop in unemployment.
On the theoretical side, we specify a dynamic general equilibrium model which com-
bines monopolistic competition in the goods market with unemployment arising from
Mortensen-Pissarides-style matching frictions and individual wage bargaining between
multiple-worker firms and workers. We identify two countervailing channels by which
product market competition affects unemployment: the first-principles output expansion
effect and the overhiring effect. From first principles, firms with monopoly power maxi-
mize profits by restricting output with respect to its full competition level. As competition
increases, profit-maximizing output expands, and along with it the demand for labor. This
in turn implies a greater rate of vacancy creation, which leads to a lower rate of unemploy-
ment. The second channel is the countervailing overhiring effect, which arises due to the
interplay of imperfect competition and individual bargaining in multi-worker firms.
First, note that the assumption of multiple-worker firms and individual bargaining are
sensible ones to model changes in product market competition in the US economy. Un-
der perfect competition in goods markets and constant returns to scale, the number and
size of firms is indeterminate, so the one-worker firm assumption is innocuous. Under
monopolistic competition, however, firm size is determinate, and varies according to the
competition faced by the firm, making a multiple-worker setup preferable. Individual bar-
gaining is consistent with the ’employment at will’ framework which is dominant in the
United States. Under individual bargaining, workers bargain individually with firms, and
firms cannot commit to long-term contracts. In such a setting, first analyzed by Stole and
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Zwiebel (1996, 1996a), the firm may choose to renegotiate the wage at any time with any
worker, effectively making each worker the marginal worker. It is important to note that
such a setup is the natural extension of paying marginal products to a framework with
wage bargaining.
Relatively little previous theoretical work has analyzed whether and how product mar-
ket rigidities may affect equilibrium labor market outcomes. Nickell (1999) provides an
insightful overview of early work which is either partial equilibrium or employing some
form of collective bargaining. Recent important contributions are the papers of Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003) and Fonseca, et. al. (2001), both of which find unemployment to be
increasing in the degree of product market regulation. Fonseca, et. al. (2001) focuses on
the impact of entry barriers on the decision to become an entrepreneur or a worker, finding
that entry barriers can indeed lead to lower rates of entrepreneurship and hence job cre-
ation. However, in their setup, those firms which have overcome the entry barriers then
face perfect competition. In contrast, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) study labor market
outcomes in a model with monopolistic competition in the goods market, but with a more
stylized labor market setting. In a similar vein, Spector (2004) studies the effects of changes
in the intensity of product market competition in a model with capital, and concludes that
product market and labor market regulations tend to reinforce one another. The latter two
papers consider static or two-period setups.
In theoretical terms, our paper is most closely related to Stole and Zwiebel (1996, 1996a),
Smith (1999), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) and Cahuc et. al. (2007). Smith (1999) and Cahuc
et. al. (2007) present models with multiple-worker firms and individual bargaining with
decreasing returns to scale, which also leads to an overhiring effect. Cahuc and Wasmer
(2001) also show that overhiring is not an issue under perfect competition and constant
returns to scale in production because marginal revenue product is constant. In addition,
using amodel without search frictions, Rotemberg (2000) argues that individual bargaining
can lead to wages that are less procyclical than their neoclassical counterparts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 characterizes short and long run equilibrium, and presents analytic results on the
impact of product market competition on labor market equilibrium. Section 4 focuses on
quantitative analysis, and examines the ability of product market deregulation, tax reform
and the decline of union bargaining power to account for the decline in US trend unem-
ployment during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
In this section, we present the basic general equilibrium model. Its main elements are
monopolistic competition in the goods market and Mortensen-Pissarides-style matching
frictions in the labor market. Our innovation lies in defining and solving the multi-worker
firm’s problem under monopolistic competition and individual bargaining. The house-
holds’ problems are standard. We restrict our analysis to the steady-state.
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2.1 Households
2.1.1 Monopolistic Competition in the Goods Market
Households are both consumers and workers. As consumers they are risk neutral in the
aggregate consumption good. Agents have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over a continuum of
differentiated goods. We use Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)’s formulation, which allows
us to connect demand elasticity σ to the number of firms n, while also allowing us to focus
on the direct effects of increased competition on the demand elasticity facing firms.4 Goods
demand each period is derived from the household’s optimization problem:
max
(
n−
1
σ
Z
c
σ−1
σ
i, j di
) σ
σ−1
(1)
subject to the budget constraint I j =
R
ci
Pi
P di where I j denotes the real income of household
j and ci, j is household j’s consumption of good i. In order to focus the dynamics on the
labor market, there is no saving. Thus we obtain aggregate demand for good i as:
Y Di ≡
Z
ci, jd j =
(
Pi
P
)−σ I
n
(2)
where I ≡
R
I jd j is aggregate real income and P =
( 1
n
R
P1−σi
) 1
1−σ is the inverse shadow price
of wealth, typically interpreted as a price index. Equation (2) is the standard monopolistic
competition demand function with elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods
given by −σ. As in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we assume that σ = σ¯g(n), g′ > 0 and
σ > 1 where n is the number of firms in the economy. n is given in the short run and
endogenously determined in the long run.
2.1.2 Search andMatching in the Labor Market
The labor market is characterized by a standard search and matching framework (e.g. Pis-
sarides (2000)). Unemployed workers u and vacancies v are converted into matches by
a constant returns to scale matching function5 m(u,v) = s · uηv1−η. Defining labor market
tightness as θ ≡ v
u
, the firm meets unemployed workers at rate q(θ) = sθ−η, while the un-
employed workers meet vacancies at rate f (θ) = sθ1−η.
Workers and firms are identical so that all jobs are identical. For each worker, the value
of employment is given by VE , which satisfies
VE = w(1− τL)+
1
1 + r
[
χV ′U +(1−χ)V ′E
]
(3)
where χ is the total separation rate, w denotes the per period real wage, VU is the value of
being unemployed in the current period and V ′E and V ′U are the values of being employed
4A previous version of this paper, Ebell and Haefke (2006), used the standard Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. The
results are nearly indistinguishable.
5η denotes the elasticity of matches with respect to the number of unemployed. As is quite standard in the
literature, s denotes a scaling parameter. While it is true that the Cobb Douglas specification does not guarantee
matching probabilities in the unit interval, it is de facto the case for any of the parameter values reported in the
later sections.
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and unemployed in the next period respectively. τL is a labor tax, which is returned to
agents in the form of a lump-sum transfer. Firms and workers may separate either because
the match is destroyed, which occurs with exogenous6 probability χ˜ or because the firm has
exited, which occurs with probability δ. We assume that these two sources of separation
are independent, so that the total separation probability is given by χ = χ˜ + δ+ χ˜δ. Explicit
firm exit is incorporated mainly for quantitative reasons. If firms were counterfactually
infinitely lived, then the impact of a given level of entry costs would be greatly understated,
since firms could amortize those entry costs over an infinite lifespan.
The value of unemployment is standard:
VU = b +
1
1 + r
{ f (θ)V ′E +[1− f (θ)]V ′U} (4)
where b denotes utility when unemployed. It will also be useful for the bargaining to define
the worker’s surplus VW as the difference between the value function when employed and
when unemployed:
VW = (1− τL)w−b +
1
1 + r
[1−χ− f (θ)]V ′W . (5)
2.2 Multiple-worker Firms
Firms are monopolistically competitive. We abandon the one-worker-per-firm assumption
in favor of a more general framework with multiple-worker firms. Under perfect compe-
tition in goods markets and constant returns to scale, the one-worker firm assumption is
harmless, since the number and size of firms is indeterminate7. Under monopolistic com-
petition, however, firm size is determinate, and varies according to the demand elasticity σ
faced by the firm, among others. The only way to vary firm size with a given technology
is to vary the amount of labor employed either on the intensive margin or on the extensive
margin8. Consistent with the long run focus of our paper, we assume that firms adjust em-
ployment by varying the number of workers rather than the number of hours per worker.
Firms maximize the discounted value of future profits. Firm i’s state variable is the
number of workers currently employed, hi. The firm’s key decision is the number of vacan-
cies. Firms open as many vacancies as necessary to hire in expectation the desired number
of workers next period, while taking into account that the real cost to opening a vacancy is
ΦV . The firm’s problem becomes:
VF (hi) = max
h′i,vi
{
Pi (yi)
P
yi−w(hi)hi−ΦV vi +
1− δ
1 + r
VF
(
h′i
)}
, (6)
6Recently, Koeniger and Prat (2006) have extended our model to allow for endogenous separations and study
effects of firing costs and on the job search.
7This argument is formalized in Cahuc and Wasmer (2001). Smith (1999) examines individual bargaining in
a multi-worker firm under perfect competition and decreasing returns to scale, the other case in which the one-
worker-per-firm assumption breaks down.
8In a model with capital, firms could also vary output by varying only the amount of capital employed. In
order to maintain an optimal capital-labor ratio, however, firms would also generally adjust by varying labor as
well.
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subject to
demand function:
Pi (yi)
P
=
(
yi
1
n
I
)− 1σ
(7)
production function: yi = Ahi (8)
transition function: h′i = (1− χ˜)hi + q(θ)vi (9)
wage curve: w(hi) (10)
where the wage curve is the result of individual bargaining as described in section 2.3.1.
The firm’s problem takes into account that a measure δ of firms exits each period.
The first order condition states that the marginal value of an additional worker must
equal the cost of searching for him/her, weighted by the probability of firm survival 1− δ:
ΦV
q(θ)
1 + r
1− δ =
∂VF (h′i)
∂h′i
, (11)
while the envelope condition gives the value of the marginal worker to the firm:
∂VF (hi)
∂hi
=
σ−1
σ
A
Pi (yi)
P
−w(hi)−hi
∂w
∂hi
+(1− χ˜) ΦV
q(θ) . (12)
This latter equation will be useful in the treatment of wage bargaining in the following
subsection, as it gives the firm’s surplus in the bargaining problem.
Combining (11) with the envelope condition and using the definition of demand elas-
ticity ∂Pi∂yi
yi
Pi =−
1
σ yields the firm’s Euler equation for employment:
ΦV
q(θ) =
1− δ
1 + r
[
σ−1
σ
A
Pi (y′i)
P
−w
(
h′i
)
−h′i
∂w
∂h′i
+(1− χ˜) ΦV
q(θ′)
]
. (13)
This Euler equation describes the firm’s optimal employment decision. The left hand side
represents the cost to hiring the marginal worker, the cost per vacancyΦV multiplied by the
number of vacancies to hire a worker 1q(θ) .
9 The right hand side represents the discounted
future benefits to hiring the marginal worker. The first two terms in brackets are standard,
representing the worker’s marginal revenue product net of wages. The third term, h′i ∂w∂h′i ,
reflects firms’ correct anticipation that the bargained wage (i.e. the wage curve) will be a
function of the firm’s employment level hi. In section 2.3 wewill connect this wage bargain-
ing term to the hiring externality. The fourth term in brackets represents the future savings
in hiring costs from having hired the worker today, taking into account the probability of
separation χ˜.
2.3 Wage Bargaining
In this sectionwe describe thewage bargaining, allowing us to generate thewage curve and
complete the description of the firm’s optimal employment decision. In the neo-classical
9In a one-worker firm model, 1q(θ) represents the average duration to fill a vacancy. In the multi-worker firm
model, however, q(θ)vi is the number of workers hired by posting vi vacancies. To hire one worker, then, the firm
should post 1q(θ) vacancies.
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framework, workers are paid their marginal products. The natural extension to a bargain-
ing environment is the individual bargaining setup introduced by Stole and Zwiebel (1996).
The key assumption of the individual bargaining framework is that firms cannot commit
to long-term employment contracts, and may renegotiate wages with each worker at any
time, making eachworker effectively the marginal worker. The firm’s inability to commit is
the key characteristic of the ’employment at will’ environment dominant in US labor mar-
kets. Also, individual bargaining involves bargaining over wages only, since an individual
worker can only deprive the firm of her own marginal product, which does not give the
worker sufficient leverage to negotiate hiring.
We later calibrate to US labor markets, in which ’employment at will’ is dominant, and
which are hence better characterized by individual than collective bargaining. In the time
period we consider, between 78% and 90% of private sector workers were not covered by a
collective bargaining agreement, according to CPS data reported in Hirsch andMacpherson
(2003).
2.3.1 Individual Bargaining Solution
Under individual bargaining, the firm’s outside option is not remaining idle, but rather
producing with one worker less. The key point of the individual bargaining framework is
that eachworker is treated as themarginal worker, so that the bargaining problembecomes:
max
w
β lnVW +(1−β)ln ∂VF∂hi (14)
where β is the worker’s bargaining power. Substituting the expressions for worker’s sur-
plus (5) and firm’s surplus (12) into the first order condition of (14) leads to a first-order
linear differential equation in the wage
(1− τL)w(hi) = (1−β)b− 1−β1 + r [1−χ− f (θ)]V
′
W (15)
+β(1− τL)
[
σ−1
σ
Pi (yi)
P
A−hi
∂w
∂hi
+(1− χ˜) ΦV
q(θ)
]
.
The differential equation (15) has a standard solution, which is derived in the appendix.
The important assumption made in deriving the solution presented below in Equation (16)
is that future surplusV ′W is not a function of current firm-level employment hi or of the cur-
rent firm-level bargained wage w(hi). This assumption will be confirmed in the following
subsections, as the future value of worker’s surplus V ′W will turn out to depend only on
aggregate variables:
(1− τL)w(hi) = (1−β)b− 1−β1 + r [1−χ− f (θ)]V
′
W (16)
+β(1− τL)
[
σ−1
σ−β
Pi (yi)
P
A +(1− χ˜) ΦV
q(θ)
]
.
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2.3.2 Labor demand and the wage curve
We can now obtain a closed form for the firm’s Euler equation (13) by taking the slope of
(16) h′i ∂w∂h′i =−
β
σ
σ−1
σ−β A
Pi(yi)
P to obtain a closed form for the firm’s Euler equation:
ΦV
q(θ) =
1− δ
1 + r
[
σ−1
σ−βA
Pi (y′i)
P
−w
(
h′i
)
+(1− χ˜) ΦV
q(θ′)
]
. (17)
Equation (17) can be interpreted as a job creation or as a labor demand expression which
relates the firm’s wage w(hi) to its employment level hi.
Proposition 1 The wage curve takes the form:
(1− τL)w(hi) = (1−β)b + β(1− τL)
[
σ−1
σ−β
Pi (yi)
P
A +
1
1− δΦV θ
]
. (18) 2
PROOF See the appendix. 
The derivation of the wage curve exploits that the value of worker’s surplus depends
only upon aggregate variables10:
1
1 + r
V ′W =
β
1−β
1
1− δ
ΦV
q(θ)
The intuition is that worker’s surplus derives from the worker’s threat to leave the firm,
depriving the firm of the worker’s contribution to profits and imposing hiring costs on the
firm. The hiring costs depend only upon aggregate labor market conditions, as summa-
rized by labor market tightness θ. The firm’s optimal employment choice guarantees that
the marginal contribution to profits (the right hand side of (17)) is equal to the cost of hiring
that worker (the left hand side of (17)). This implies that both components of the worker’s
surplus can be expressed in terms of hiring costs, which depend only upon the aggregate
variable θ and parameters.
3 Equilibrium
At this point, we impose steady-state and proceed to find the equilibrium in three steps11.
First, we find the firm-level equilibrium, that is, the wage-employment pairs that result
from the interplay of the firm’s optimal hiring decision and thewage bargaining. The firm’s
optimal hiring decision involves overhiring due to a hiring externality, which is described
analytically. Next, we find the short run general equilibrium, which amounts to finding
the equilibrium degree of labor market tightness θ while holding the degree of competition
σ facing the firms constant. This will allow us to obtain expressions for all equilibrium
variables as functions of competition σ. In a final step, we will introduce entry costs, which
will serve to endogenize the degree of competition σ(n) and hence the number of firms in
the economy n. This last equilibrium will be referred to as long-run equilibrium.
10See the proof of Proposition 1 for a detailed derivation.
11Note that our framework can easily handle shocks, and we could solve the model by log-linearizing or by
applying a variety of other numerical methods. Since our quantitative analysis focuses on long-run changes in
the competitive environment facing firms, we concentrate on the steady state here.
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3.1 Firm-level Equilibrium
In this section, we find the firm’s optimal employment-wage pair when it takes the aggre-
gate variables (labor market tightness θ and competition σ) as given.
Definition 1 Firm-level Equilibrium
A firm-level equilibrium is defined as a pair of real wages and firm-level employment hi
which satisfies both labor demand (17) and the individual bargaining wage curve (18),
taking aggregate variables (θ,σ, I) as given. 2
This firm-level equilibrium is found at the intersection of steady-state labor demand
(17) and the wage curve (18), as illustrated in Figure 4. Formally, we obtain:
A
Pi (yi)
P
=
σ−β
σ−1
[
1
1− τL
b + β
1−β
1
1− δΦV θ+
1
1−β
ΦV
q(θ)
r + χ
1− δ
]
; (19)
(1− τL)w(hi) = b +
β
1−β
1
1− δ (1− τL)
ΦV
q(θ) [r + χ + f (θ)] . (20)
Equation (19) expresses firm-level employment implicitly, while equation (20) gives the
firm-level equilibrium wage. Also note that although firm-level equilibrium wages do not
depend explicitly on σ, they will depend on competition indirectly, via equilibrium labor
market tightness θ.
3.2 Hiring Externality
The individual bargaining solution presented above displays a hiring externality of the
type first explored in partial equilibrium by Stole and Zwiebel (1996). To see this, first
recall that in the standard one-worker firm setup, optimal hiring implies that marginal
(revenue) product is equated to the cost of employing a worker. In our case, however, this
equilibrium relationship is modified by the presence of an overhiring term. Specifically,
rearranging the firm’s Euler equation (17) yields
σ−1
σ
A
Pi (yi)
P︸ ︷︷ ︸
MRPi
=
σ−β
σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
overhiring factor
(
w(hi)+
ΦV
q(θ)
r + χ
1− δ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage + hiring cost
. (21)
The overhiring factor σ−βσ < 1 expresses the fact that firms optimally hire workers beyond
the point atwhich employment costs are recouped bymarginal product12. Firms arewilling
to hire the marginal worker whose MRP does not cover their employment costs, because
hiring more workers when MRP is declining serves to depress wages due to hi ∂w∂hi < 0. For-
mally
hi
∂w
∂hi
=−
β
σ
σ−1
σ−βA
Pi (yi)
P
< 0. (22)
From (22), it is easy to see that the hiring externality is increasing in worker’s bargaining
power β and decreasing in competition σ. The steeper is MRP, the greater the wage decline
12This breakdown is due to Cahuc, et. al. (2007).
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to a marginal increase in the firm’s employment. The hiring externality disappears in the
perfect competition limit as σ→ ∞ or if β = 0.
This is analogous to the overhiring results in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Smith (1999).
In these papers, however, the source of decreasing MRP is not monopoly power but de-
creasing returns to scale in production. Also, our finding that overhiring disappears under
perfect competition is in line with the results of Cahuc and Wasmer (2001).
3.3 Short Run General Equilibrium
Now, we determine the short-run general equilibrium, taking as given the degree of com-
petition. In our setting, this is equivalent to pinning down all equilibrium variables as
functions of the degree of competition σ(n). This will allow us to determine the impact
of increasing competition on equilibrium unemployment and wages. We assume a contin-
uum of identical firms that are uniformly distributed over the unit interval.
Definition 2 Short-run General Equilibrium
A short-run general equilibrium is defined for given n and parameters
(β,b,ΦV ,δ,χ,σ,r,A) as a value of θ which:
(i) is a firm-level equilibrium satisfying (19)-(20);
(ii) satisfies the aggregate resource constraint
I =
nZ
0
Pi (yi)
P
yidi (23) 2
Due to symmetry, the price ratio becomes unity, (23) reduces to I = nyi and (19) leads to
the short-run equilibrium condition
A =
σ−β
σ−1
(
b
1− τL
+
r + χ + β f (θ)
(1−β)(1− δ) ·
ΦV
q(θ)
)
. (24)
The short-run general equilibrium condition (24) is monotonically increasing in θ, so that
existence of equilibrium is guaranteed if
A >
σ−β
σ−1
b
1− τL
. (25)
When the economy approaches full competition as σ→∞, (25) reduces to the standard con-
dition A > b that workers’ productivity be greater in employment than in unemployment.
Equation (24) is key, since it relates the degree of competition σ to short-run equilibrium
labor market tightness θ. Once we have tightness as a function of competition θ(σ), we can
obtain the short-run equilibrium unemployment rate from the Beveridge curve:
u(σ) =
χ
χ + f (θ(σ)) . (26)
We normalize the number of agents in the economy to unity. We can find equilibrium ag-
gregate employment as H (σ) = 1−u(σ). With H (σ) in hand we can find aggregate output
and subsequently the equilibrium quantity of good i, and of course short-run equilibrium
employment per firm hi (σ) and price Pi (yi), all in terms of the given degree of competition.
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3.3.1 Comparative Statics I: Varying Competition
The characterization of short-run equilibrium allows us to examine the qualitative im-
pact of varying the degree of competition σ on short-term equilibrium unemployment and
wages. We identify two main channels by which an increase in competition affects em-
ployment and unemployment: (1) the first principles output-expansion channel, which has
been discussed by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and (2) the hiring externality channel,
which is unique to our analysis of product market deregulation. Via the output expansion
channel, increased competition leads to increased employment and decreased unemploy-
ment, while the hiring externality channel works in the opposite direction.
Expanding equation (24) allows us to examine these two channels formally:
A =
σ−β
σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
overhiring < 1
σ
σ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
output expansion >1
(
1
1− τL
b + r + χ + β f (θ)
(1−β)(1− δ) ·
ΦV
q(θ)
)
. (27)
The output expansion term is simply the markup of the monopolistically competitive firm,
i.e. σσ−1 > 1. The greater is monopoly power, the greater is the markup, and the smaller
is equilibrium tightness θ for given technology A. By the Beveridge curve (26), equilib-
rium unemployment is decreasing in tightness, so greater monopoly power leads to higher
unemployment.
The hiring externality term σ−βσ < 1 is the overhiring factor discussed in the previous
subsection. When the overhiring term decreases (if monopoly power or bargaining power
β increase), then equilibrium tightness θ increases and unemployment decreases. The over-
hiring factor counteracts the output expansion effect.
The combined effect of output expansion and overhiring is given by σ−βσ−1 > 1, so that the
net effect of increasing monopoly power (i.e. decreasing σ) is to increase unemployment.
Clearly, however, since σ−βσ−1 <
σ
σ−1 , the increase in unemployment is smaller than it would
be in the absence of the overhiring effect. By just howmuch overhiring dampens the impact
of monopoly power on unemployment is a quantitative question which we will address in
the next section.
This comparative static result for short-term equilibrium is summarized in Lemma 1
and Proposition 2. All proofs are found in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Short-run equilibrium labor market tightness is a strictly increasing function of demand
elasticity σ. 2
Proposition 2 In short-run equilibrium:
(i) unemployment is strictly decreasing in competition σ,
(ii) wages are strictly increasing in competition σ. 2
The link between unemployment and competition is consistent with the empirical lit-
erature surveyed in Bassanini and Duval (2006). It is also supported by the regressions of
Felbermayr and Prat (2007) who find a significant positive coeffcient when the unemploy-
ment rate is regressed on a start-up cost index for a panel of OECD countries.
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Proposition 2 also establishes that equilibrium wages are increasing in the degree of
competition. This conclusion is the opposite of that drawn by the literature on wages and
the sharing of monopoly rents (e.g. van Reenen (1996)). The source of the disparity is that
the rent-sharing papers typically look at the partial impact on only one isolated industry,
while we consider broader increases in competition which affect all industries at once. The
general equilibrium effect of greater competition is to increase vacancies and tightness in
all sectors, making it easier for unemployed workers to find jobs. This increases the value
of the worker’s reservation utility VU , thereby improving the worker’s threat point and
increasing his/her wage. In addition, equilibrium match surplus, given by β1−β
ΦV
q(θ)
r+χ
1−δ , is
also increasing in competition. The reason is that in equilibrium the value of the marginal
worker is the cost of searching for him/her, which increases with θ and hence with σ (see
Lemma 1). Hence, equilibrium wages are increasing in the economywide degree of com-
petition.
The empirical literature is silent on the impact of the economywide degree of com-
petition on wages (or wage shares). To get an idea of whether the wage share might be
increasing in competition (e.g. whether the wage share is decreasing in regulation), we
regress a measure of entry regulation on the wage share for a group of OECD countries, as
illustrated13 in Figure 3. The correlation is highly negative (−0.804) and significant at the
1% level. Although this is only illustrative of the data, it is suggestive that wage shares in
the data might indeed be increasing in competition. It is also consistent with the positive
wage effect of competition suggested by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
3.3.2 Comparative Statics II: Varying Parameters
Proposition 3 summarizes the impact of varying parameters on short-run equilibrium.
Proposition 3 In short-run equilibrium:
(i) labor market tightness θ is decreasing in b, ΦV , r, δ, and χ˜;
(ii) unemployment is increasing in b, ΦV , r, δ, and χ˜;
(iii) labor market tightness is decreasing in β and unemployment is increasing in β as long as
σ > σ˜ where
σ˜ ≡
(1− τL)b + ΦVq(θ)
1
(1−δ)(1−β)
[
r+χ+β f (θ)
1−β + β f (θ)
]
ΦV
q(θ)
1
(1−δ)(1−β)
[
r+χ+β f (θ)
(1−β) + f (θ)
] .
2
The results of parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 are standard for search and matching
models. Higher unemployment benefits, hiring costs, interest rates and separation rates all
increase unemployment. Part (iii) merits comment. Unemployment increases in worker’s
bargaining power (as is standard), unless the degree of competition is very low. The intu-
ition is that when competition is low, higher worker’s bargaining power strengthens the
13The data on labor share is the compensation to GDP ratio taken from Gollin (2002), table 2, column 4. The
data on entry regulation is the regulation index of Fonseca, et. al. (2001), table 2, column 4.
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overhiring effect (i.e. increases firms’ incentives to hire more workers in the sense that
∂2wi
∂hi∂β −
σ−1
(σ−β)2
A
hi
Pi(yi)
P < 0) so much, that the end result is lower unemployment.
3.4 Long-run General Equilibrium
Now we are ready to endogenize the degree of competition. In the long-run, firms may
enter each industry by paying a real entry cost ΦE and by posting enough vacancies to hire
the steady-state workforce. The details of firm entry and exit are as follows: Each period a
measure δ of firms exits, and is replaced by a measure δ of new entrants14. New entrants
begin production immediately with their steady-state workforce. Hence, we assume that
entering firms know far enough in advance that they will be entering to complete all entry
formalities. During this (these) pre-entry period(s) firms pay the entry cost. Because of
the constant marginal vacancy posting cost they optimally post enough vacancies to hire
their steady-state workforce immediately15. Entry by firms will continue until profits net of
entry costs have been competed down to zero. Hence, free entry in the presence of barriers
to entry leads to an equilibrium number of firms n∗, which is defined implicitly by:
ΦE (σ(n∗))+ ΦV
hi (σ(n∗))
q(θ(σ(n∗))) = VF (hi (σ(n
∗))) . (28)
The free entry condition states that the entry cost plus initial hiring costs must be amortized
by profits over the firm’s expected lifespan. Since equilibrium profits are decreasing in
competition ∂VF∂σ < 0, free entry forges a negative link between barriers to entry and the
degree of competition/the number of firms in the economy16.
Entry barriers take two complementary forms, time and pecuniary costs. For 1997 we
have detailed data on the number of business days it takes to set up a standardized OECD
firm as reported by Pissarides (2003) and on entry fees as a percentage of per capita GDP
from Djankov, et. al. (2002). We combine the two measures into a single one by adding up
the entry costs as a percentage of monthly per capita GDP and the lost output of a single
firm during the entry delay period. Formally, total barriers17 to entry are found as:
ΦE (σ(n)) = d · yi + ϕ · I (σ(n∗)) (29)
14Recently, Felbermayr and Prat (2007) have extended our framework to allow for endogenous firm entry and
exit. In their setup they distinguish between set-up costs and a fixed ’red tape’ cost that has to be paid every period
that the firm is in operation. Thus they create endogenous firm exit. Based on estimation of their model for a panel
of OECD countries they conclude that reducing regulatory cost for incumbent firms yields little employment gain.
15Note that it is not necessary to take the measure δ of pre-entry firms into account in aggregate income. They
do not yet produce, and only incur vacancy costs. Hence the firm’s profits and vacancy costs sum to zero.
16To forge an explicit link between barriers to entry and the number of firms, one may take two routes. We
follow Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and assume that σ is an increasing function of the number of firms. Alter-
natively, one may hold σ constant, and allow for n firms competing via Cournot in each industry. In a previous
version of this paper, we followed this second setup. Results are very similar to those of the simpler Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003) setup presented here, and are available upon request.
17 Our choice for the specification of entry barriers as proportion of output is driven by the data we have
available. More precisely, we implicitly rule out the case in which there is a fixed fee to enter that does not depend
on income. While such a fixed fee would pose no difficulty to include, we follow Blanchard and Givavazzi (2003)
because the absence of fixed fees is analytically more convenient.
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where d is the regulatory delay in months, yi is firm-level output, ϕ are entry fees as a
percentage of monthly per capita GDP, and I (σ(n∗)) is aggregate income. Combining (29)
with the free entry condition (28) yields:
d · yi + ϕ · I (σ(n∗))+ ΦV
hi (σ(n∗))
q(θ(σ(n∗))) = VF (hi (σ(n
∗))) . (30)
Equation (30) closes the long-run equilibrium. It determines the endogenous number of
firms n∗ and the degree of competition σ(n∗) in long-run equilibrium by defining a negative
relationship between barriers to entry and the degree of competition in the long-run.
4 Quantitative Results
We are now in a position to calibrate our model and approach our quantitative questions.
We explore two alternative calibrations: a traditional calibration along the lines of Shimer
(2005) and a small surplus calibration similar to that in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
For each calibration we ask: What is the impact of increasing competition on equilibrium
unemployment and wages? In order to answer the question, we run policy experiments
designed to assess whether the product market deregulation of the late 1970’s and early
1980’s could account for the subsequent decline inUS unemployment during the 1980’s and
1990’s. In addition, we examine whether other factors, such as the decline in labor taxation
or the waning of union bargaining power could account for the decline in unemployment.
Finally, we go on to quantify the overhiring effect.
4.1 Calibration
Our model period is one month. All parameters for both the traditional and the small
surplus calibration are reported in Table 4. In both cases, we calibrate the model to US data
in 1998.
The majority of parameters is common to both calibrations. We normalize the level of
technology A to unity. Our choice of 4.0% for the annualized real interest rate is standard.
We set the job-finding rate f (θ) to be 0.45 monthly following Shimer (2005), and target
the 1998 HP-trend value for unemployment of 5.1%18 by setting the total separation rate
χ = 0.024 monthly, roughly in line with the estimates in Shimer (2005). We set δ = 0.8%, so
that the monthly probability that a firm will cease to exist implies an annual firm survival
rate of 90.8%. This matches the average five-year survival probability reported by Wagner
(1994) and is in line with the four-year survival probabilities reported inMata and Portugal
(1994), which imply monthly exit rates between 0.6 and 1.4%. We set worker’s bargaining
power so that β = 0.5019, in line with the estimates of Abowd and Allain (1996) and Yashiv
18We wish to concentrate on the long-run impact of regulation, abstracting from business cycle considerations.
Hence, we use the HP-trend value, in which the business cycle component has been filtered out using a smoothing
parameter of 1e6.
19Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) choose β to match the wage elasticity of productivity. They obtain a very
small value of β = 0.052. We will discuss the impact of such low values of bargaining power on our results later
in the paper.
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(2001). We let the matching elasticity take the value, η = 0.5020, in the range reported by
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). We also choose q(θ) = 0.238, as in den Haan, Ramey and
Watson (2000). Our choices for job-finding and job-filling rates pin down US equilibrium
labor market tightness in 1998 to be θ = f (θ)q(θ) = 1.89.
21 This value for tightness looks high
at first glance. However, it is necessary to adjust for the fact that firms open as many va-
cancies as necessary in order to fulfill their hiring needs in expectation. If we multiply the
equilibrium tightness θ with the firm’s matching rate, we find a ratio of open jobs to unem-
ployed of 45%, in line with the findings of Shimer (2005). We set the scaling parameter of
the matching function to satisfy s =
f (θ)
θ1−η . In both the traditional and small surplus baseline
calibrations, we set labor taxes to 32% to match the 1998 labor wedge reported in Prescott
(2002)22. Tax revenues are redistributed to households in the form of lump-sum transfers.
Finally, we need to parameterize the function relating demand elasticity to the number of
firms. In a fully microfounded formulation of Cournot competition within industries23, the
demand elasticity faced by the firm is given by σ · n, where n is the number of firms. For
this reason, we choose g(n) = n and normalize σ = 1.
4.1.1 Traditional vs Small Surplus Calibration
At this point, we are left with a short-run equilibrium condition (24) which relates the util-
ity from unemployment b to the vacancy posting costs ΦV . We first decompose 24 total
utility from unemployment b into an unemployment benefits component bb and a home
production or leisure component bh, so that b = bb +bhNext, we choose the benefits compo-
nent bb = 0.187 so that the net benefit replacement rate bbw(1−τL) = 0.30, in line with US data.
Finally, for the traditional calibrationwe choose the home production or leisure component
bh = 0.198 so that the model’s semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to benefits is
equal to 2.0, as estimated by Costain and Reiter (2008). The resulting total replacement rate
b
w(1−τL) is 0.62.
In the small surplus calibration, targeting a semi-elasticity of benefits of 14.0 leads
to a home production component of benefits of bh = 0.326 and a total replacement rate
b
w(1−τL)
= 0.95, as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Hence, the only difference between
the traditional and small surplus calibrations is the home production component of utility
bh and hence the total utility from unemployment b.
20In a previous version of the paper, we established that the Hosios (1990) condition is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for efficiency in our setup. As the demand elasticity goes to infinity, the economy converges
to the perfect competition limit in which the Hosios condition holds.
21Pinning down the value of θ does not fully describe short-run equilibrium, as long as some other variables or
parameters are left free. In our case, these parameters will be ΦV and b.
22We also looked at a setting with both a labor tax and a consumption tax, and the results were very similar.
23cf. Galí and Zilibotti (1994) for such a framework.
24Due to linear utility, of course, only the total utility from unemployment b matters for our calibration. The
breakdown into benefit and home production components will be useful later, however, in the policy experiments.
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4.1.2 Entry Costs
For 1997, we can use the detailed entry cost data reported in Table 1, resulting in entry
costs for the US corresponding to 0.6 months of aggregate per capita income. Djankov,
et. al. (2003) report entry fees of 1.0% of annual per capita income, or 12% of monthly
per capital income. Pissarides (2003) compiles an index for entry delay as the number of
business days it takes (on average) to fulfill entry requirements, weighted by the number of
procedures that must be performed. The US entry delay index is 8.6 days, or 0.47 months
of lost output, based on 220 business days in a year. Adding the two measures yields total
entry costs equal to 0.59 months of output. In what follows, we will call our composite
measure of entry fees and entry delay costs for 1997 the Djankov/Pissarides index.
For 1978, such detailed entry cost data is unavailable. However, Nicoletti and Scarpetta
(2003) have compiled an index on product market regulation for a set of 21 countries whose
starting date is 1978 and whose ending date is 1998. These 1978 and 1998 index values are
displayed in the middle columns of Table 2 for the subset of 17 countries for which both
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001)’s panel index for 1978-1998 and the detailed cross section
data for 1997 is available.
In order to estimate US entry costs, we use a triangulation procedure. To estimate entry
costs in 1978, we first run the following regression:
Djankov/Pissarides1997,i = α0 + α1 ·Nicoletti/Scarpetta1998,i + εi. (31)
The results of the regression are reported in Table 3. We first note that the correlation be-
tween Nicoletti and Scarpetta’s index in 1998 and our combined Pissarides/Djankov index
(first column of Table 2) is very high at 0.77. Hence, both indices seem to be measuring
the same things. The estimate of α̂1 is highly significant, with a t−Statistic of 4.7, while the
estimate for α̂0 is marginally significant. Next, we use the estimates α̂0 and α̂1 to transform
the Nicoletti and Scarpetta index value for 1978 into a Djankov/Pissarides-style index for
1978, by taking
Djankov/Pissarides1978,i = α̂0 + α̂1 ·Nicoletti/Scarpetta1978,i. (32)
The results of the projection (32) are displayed in the last column of Table 2. For the US, the
resulting measure of entry costs for 1978 is 5.2 months of per capita output, a nearly 9-fold
increase relative to 1997.
4.1.3 Baseline 1998 Calibrations
The results of the traditional and small surplus baseline calibrations to the US economy
in 1998 are presented in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. The bottom right panel of Figure 5
shows that under the traditional calibration, 1998 US entry cost and profits are equalized
when demand elasticity σ is 8.2, which corresponds to a markup of 7.0%25. The bottom
right panel of Figure 6 shows that under the small surplus calibration, the 1998 US long-
run equilibrium implies a demand elasticity of 18.8 and a somewhat smaller markup of
25Under individual bargaining, the markup is given by σ−βσ−1 .
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2.8%26. The 7% markup lies well within the typical 5%–15% range of reported markups,
e.g. Martins et al, (1996) or Rotemberg and Woodford, (1995).
Figures 5 and 6 also show how unemployment and wages respond to varying degrees
of product market competition. As expected, unemployment is decreasing and real wages
are increasing in competition, where competition is measured as demand elasticity σ. We
note that the bulk of the impact of monopoly power on wages and unemployment occurs
under very low levels of demand elasticity. This is consistent with the empirical results of
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), who find that most of the benefits to increased competition
come from the entry of the first three to five competitors, with very little benefits accruing
to further entry.
4.2 Product Market Deregulation and the Labor Market
We now use the model to run a policy experiment, in order to assess to what extent product
market deregulation can directly account for the decline in U.S. unemployment during the
80’s and 90’s. We do this by taking the 1998US baselinemodel calibrated above as a starting
point, and then examining the impact of raising entry costs to 1978 levels. We emphasize
that we are interested in matching the unemployment differential fromHP-trend data from
which the business cycle component has been filtered out, in line with our focus on the
long-run impact of a change in product market regulation.
To run the experiments, we hold the utility from home production bh fixed in 1998 and
1978, and adjust bb so that the benefit replacement rate bbw(1−τL) remains fixed at 30%. All
other parameters are held fixed at their 1998 levels.
Results of the deregulation policy experiment are presented in Tables 5 and 6. In the
traditional calibration, changes in product market regulation can only account for a sur-
prisingly small change in equilibrium unemployment. Raising entry costs nearly nine-fold
to their 1978 levels does lead to a substantial decrease in competition, causing markups to
increase by about 50%, from 7.0% to 10.6%. The resulting increase in unemployment is very
small, however, at less than two-tenths of one percentage point, causing unemployment to
rise from 5.10% to 5.26%. In contrast, in the data, trend unemployment increases from 5.1%
in 1998 to 7.2% in 1978, as shown in Figure 1.
Under the small surplus calibration, however, we find that product market deregula-
tion can account for nearly the entire decrease in unemployment between 1978 and 1998. In
particular, raising entry costs to their 1978 levels causes unemployment to rise from 5.10%
to 7.2%, an increase of 2.1 percentage points27. However, the small surplus calibration is
controversial, as it is inconsistent with evidence on the semi-elasticity of unemployment
with respect to benefits (Costain and Reiter, 2008) and furthermore implies implausibly
large labor supply elasticities at the extensive margin (Haefke and Reiter, 2006). This ten-
sion between the small and large surplus calibration is the same as in the unemployment
26The greater degree of equilibrium competition (higher σ ) and lower markups are due to the smaller profits
in the small surplus calibration.
27Markups increase from 2.8% in 1998 to 6.9% in 1978.
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volatility puzzle, where a small surplus calibration can explain high employment and un-
employment variation over the business cycle, but a large surplus calibration cannot.
In both calibrations, the quantitative impact of productmarket deregulation onwages is
modest. Under the traditional calibration, deregulation increases net real wages by about
3.3%, from 0.602 in 1978 to 0.622 in 1998. Using the small surplus calibration leads to a
slightly larger deregulation induced wage increase of 3.8%, as wages increase from 0.635 to
0.659.
4.3 Interactions
4.3.1 Labor taxation
Next, we examine the role of tax reforms and interactions between product market dereg-
ulation and tax reforms in accounting for the decline in unemployment between 1978 and
1998. In order to do this, we increase entry costs to their 1978 levels, and in addition,
increase the labor tax rate τL as much as necessary to generate the higher 1978 level of
unemployment of 7.2%.
Results of this experiment are reported in Table 8. In order to generate the entire 1998 to
1978 unemployment differential of ∆u = 2.1%, labor tax rates would have had to be 56.6%
in 1978, compared with 32.0% in 1998. In this case, tax reform would account for 81.1%
of the unemployment difference, while the change in entry costs would only account for
18.9%.
4.3.2 Worker’s bargaining power
Now we examine the role of a decline in worker’s bargaining power over the 1980’s and
1990’s, and interactions between bargaining power and product market deregulation in
accounting for the 1978-1998 decline in unemployment. Again, we both set entry costs
to their 1978 levels and increase bargaining power as much as necessary to generate the
higher 1978 level of unemployment of 7.2%.
Results of this experiment are reported in Table 9. The combined effect of increased en-
try costs and increasing worker’s bargaining power from 50% to 66.6% would be to gener-
ate a 1978 unemployment rate of 7.2%. In this case, the increase in entry costs would only
account for 10.7% of the unemployment change, while the increase in bargaining power
would account for 89.3%. From Table 9, one can see that this result is quite robust to the
initial 1998 worker’s bargaining power assumed. The decline in worker bargaining power
is an established fact over this period. Figure 2 in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) indi-
cates a drop in the labor share of the nonfinancial corporate sector of about 20 percentage
points from 80% to 60% (without adjusting for cyclical variation). Our data in Figure 2
indicates a decline in union density by roughly 10 percentage points over the same period.
In fact, Fiori et al (2007) provide empirical evidence that product market deregulation can
lead to lower worker bargaining power28.
28In this sense what we measure as product market deregulation is the direct effect of deregulation, whereas
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The results in Table 9 are furthermore consistent with the econometric results of Fiori et
al (2007)who report for a panel of OECD countries that employment gains have been larger
when workers’ bargaining power was initially high. As we increase the level of bargaining
power, the contribution of product market deregulation in explaining the unemployment
differential increases from 7 to 17%.
4.3.3 Matching efficiency
Finally, we consider an increase in matching efficiency during the 1980’s and 1990’s, and
interactions between increased matching efficiency and product market deregulation. We
run the experiment by both increasing entry costs to their 1978 levels and allowing match-
ing efficiency to decrease sufficiently in 1978 so as to explain the entire 2.1 percentage point
1978-1998 unemployment differential.
Results of this experiment are reported in Table 10. In order to generate the increase
in unemployment to its 1978 level of 7.2%, matching efficiency in 1978 would need to be
about 50% lower in 1978 than in 1998, taking on a 1978 value of 0.24. In this case, the
increase in entry costs would only account for about 10.1% of the unemployment change,
while a decrease in matching efficiency would account for nearly 90%.
4.4 Quantifying Overhiring
In the policy experiment, we saw that the impact of monopoly power on unemployment
under the traditional calibration was surprisingly small. In order to assess which role the
hiring externality is playing in counteracting the first principles output expansion effect of
increasing competition, we proceed to quantify the overhiring effect. To this end, we repeat
our deregulation policy experiment while shutting down the overhiring effect. Formally,
this is accomplished by replacing σ−βσ−1 with
σ
σ−1 in equations (18), (19) and (24)
29. This guar-
antees that firm-level equilibrium equates marginal revenue product and employment cost
(wages plus hiring costs), as would be the case in a standard one-worker firm matching
model. Of course, we also recalibrate the model, using the same targets as in the baseline
traditional calibration. The results are given in Table 7 and Figure 7. The overhiring ef-
fect has essentially no impact on the increase in unemployment which can be attributed
to higher 1978 entry costs. The reason is that although shutting down overhiring rotates
the unemployment curve upwards (and more so for higher worker bargaining power, β,
as can be seen in Figure 8), this non-optimal firm behavior also reduces firm’s profits30,
so that equilibrium demand elasticities are increased and markups decreased in both 1978
and 1998. Now, moving from 1998 to 1978 increases markups from 4.9 % to 6.7 %, while in
the presence of overhiring markups in 1998 and 1978 were 7.0% and 10.6% respectively. As
we are subsuming the indirect effect in our variation of the worker bargaining power. Incorporating the effect of
product market deregulation on labor market institutions, especially unions, is the focus of our companion paper
(Ebell and Haefke, 2006a), which builds on the model presented here and focuses on the question of deregulating
European product and labor markets
29This is equivalent to setting the overhiring factor σ−βσ = 1.
30Recall that overhiring is optimal in our setting, while setting MRP to employment costs is suboptimal.
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a result, the decline in unemployment which can be attributed to product market deregu-
lation is nearly the same as in the presence of an overhiring effect.
Alternatively, one can shut down the overhiring effect, and examine the impact on un-
employment of moving from a markup of 7.0% in 1998 (corresponding to a demand elas-
ticity of 8.2) to a markup of 10.6% in 1978 (corresponding to a demand elasticity of 5.7 in
1978). Now, the impact on unemployment does increase slightly to 0.30 percentage points,
compared to an increase of 0.16 percentage points in the presence of overhiring.
Hence, we conclude that the small impact of deregulation on unemployment under the
traditional calibration does not depend only on the overhiring effect being operative.
4.5 Robustness
We now proceed to check the robustness of our quantitative results. We vary the calibration
targets for the job-finding rates f , for the monthly rate of firm exit δ, the matching elasticity
η, worker’s bargaining power β and the semi-elasticity of unemployment to benefits ξub
one-by-one, all in the traditional calibration. We do not vary the targeted job-filling rate q,
as this would only renormalize the model.
The results of the robustness exercises are presented in Table 11, both with and without
overhiring. We find that our choice for all of these parameters is innocuous, with the excep-
tion of the semi-elasticity of unemployment to benefits ξub. As the semi-elasticity increases
(i.e. as the total replacement rate b
w(1−τL)
increases), the importance of deregulation in ex-
plaining the 2.1 percentage point unemployment difference between 1978 and 1998 also
increases, as we have already seen from our results on the small surplus calibration. The
interaction between worker bargaining power, β, and the semi-elasticity of unemployment
with respect to benefits, ξub, is especially noteworthy and depicted in Figure 9. For very low
worker bargaining power (as assumed, in Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008), ξub ≈ 30 would
be needed to generate the 1978–1998 unemployment differential, while ξub ≈ 10 is sufficient
for β = 0.95.
5 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper has been to study the relationship between product mar-
ket regulation and labor market outcomes. Our main contribution is twofold. First, we
develop a dynamic model with imperfect competition and search frictions, which is well
suited for the quantitative analysis of the present paper. Our model contains the interesting
feature that the standard monopoly distortion of underproduction is partially offset by an
overhiring incentive, especially when monopoly power is high.
We then use our model to ask whether the Carter/Reagan deregulation of the late 1970s
and early 1980s could account for the subsequent decline in US trend unemployment rates.
Our answer depends crucially on whether we employ a traditional or a small surplus cal-
ibration. Under the traditional calibration, increasing entry costs from their 1998 to their
1978 levels results in a very small increase in unemployment of less than two-tenths of one
20
percentage point. Under the small surplus calibration, in contrast, the same increase in en-
try costs leads to an increase of 2.1 percentage points in unemployment, accounting for the
entire difference in HP-trend unemployment between 1978 and 1998.
We also interact product market deregulation with tax reform and a possible decline in
worker’s bargaining power. We find that our result that product market deregulation is
unable to account for most of the decline in unemployment is robust to the inclusion of tax
reform and declining worker’s bargaining power. In order to account for the full 2.1 per-
centage point decline in trend unemployment, labor taxeswould have had to decrease from
56.6% in 1978 to 32.0% in 1998, or worker’s bargaining power would have had to decline
from 66.6% in 1978 to 50% in 1998. In either case, the direct contribution from deregula-
tion remains less than 20% of the entire differential. These theoretical findings are in line
with the empirical results of Fiori et al (2007) who find no significant employment effect
of product market deregulation in countries where labor market policies are loose. This
observation leads us to expect stronger effects for the more heavily regulated European
economies.
Finally, we find that product market regulation could lead to modest increases in real
wages, providing some support for the political economy arguments in favor of combining
labor and product market reform found in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
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Appendix A Proofs and Derivations
A.1 Solving the Differential Equation
The differential equation to be solved is given by equation (15):
(1− τL)w(hi) = (1−β)b− 1−β1 + r [1−χ− f (θ)]V
′
W
+β(1− τL)
[
σ−1
σ
Pi (yi)
P
A−hi
∂w
∂hi
+(1− χ˜) ΦV
q(θ)
]
.
Ignoring the constant terms for now, the equation becomes31
w(hi) = β
[
σ−1
σ
Pi (yi)
P
A−hi
∂w
∂hi
]
. (33)
Begin by focusing attention on the homogenous equation
w(hi)
βhi +
∂w
∂hi
= 0, (34)
which has solution
w(hi) = Kh−1/βi (35)
where K is a constant of integration. Next, assume that K = K (hi) and take the derivative
of both sides of (35) to obtain
∂w
∂hi
= h−1/βi
∂K
∂hi
−
1
β Kh
−1−β
β
i . (36)
Now substitute (36) and (35) into (33) to obtain
∂K
∂hi
= h
1−β
β
i
σ−1
σ
Pi (yi)
P
A, (37)
where Pi(yi)P =
(
Ahi
1
n Y
)− 1σ
. Integrating (37) yields
K = A
(
A
1
n
Y
)− 1σ
σ−1
σ
Z
h
1−β
β −
1
σ
i dhi + J
which has solution
K = A
(
A
1
n
Y
)− 1σ
σ−1
σ
Z
h
1−β
β −
1
σ
i dhi + J
= A
(
A
1
n
Y
)− 1σ
σ−1
σ
βσ
σ−βh
1
β−
1
σ
i + J (38)
31This solution follows Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2004).
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Finally, substituting (38) back into (35) yields
w(hi) = β σ−1
σ−βA
Pi (yi)
P
+ Jh−1/βi .
Assuming that limhi→0 hiw(hi) = 0 pins down the constant J = 0. Adding back the constant
terms gives the solution to the differential equation given by (16).
(1− τL)w(hi) = (1−β)b− 1−β1 + r [1−χ− f (θ)]V
′
W
+β(1− τL)
[
σ−1
σ−β
Pi (yi)
P
A +(1− χ˜) ΦV
q(θ)
]
.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Begin by solving (16) for 11+r [1−χ−θq(θ)]V ′W and substituting back into theworker’s
surplus equation (5) to obtain
VW =
β
1−β (1− τL)
[
σ−1
σ−β
Pi (yi)
P
A−w(hi)+ (1− χ˜)
ΦV
q(θ)
]
. (39)
Taking ahead one period and using the firm’s optimality condition (17), one obtains
1
1 + r
V ′W = (1− τL)
β
1−β
1
1− δ
ΦV
q(θ) . (40)
Using (40) to substitute out for V ′W in (16) yields the wage curve (18)
(1− τL)w(hi) = (1−β)b + β(1− τL)
[
σ−1
σ−β
Pi (yi)
P
A +
1
1− δΦV θ
]
.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: We need to establish that ∂θ∂σ > 0. Applying the implicit function theorem to equation
(24) gives us:
∂θ
∂σ =
1−β
(σ−1)(σ−β)
b
1−τL +
r+χ+β f (θ)
(1−β)(1−δ) ·
ΦV
q(θ)
ΦV
(1−β)(1−δ)
[
βΦV − (r + χ) q′(θ)q(θ)2
] > 0
where the numerator is clearly positive. The denominator is also positive due to β ∈ (0,1),
σ > 1 by (25) and q′ (θ) < 0 for a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas matching function.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: (i) Differentiating the Beveridge curve (26) with respect to θ yields that
∂u
∂θ =−χ
f ′ (θ)
[χ + f (θ)]2 < 0
since the job-finding rate is increasing in tightness f ′ (θ) > 0 for all constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas matching functions. By Lemma 1, ∂θ∂σ > 0. Application of the chain rule
yields that ∂u∂σ =
∂u
∂θ
∂θ
∂σ < 0.
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(ii) Differentiating the equilibrium wage (20) with respect to θ yields that
∂w
∂θ =
β
1−β
1− τL
1− δ ΦV
[
1− (r + χ) q
′ (θ)
q(θ)2
]
> 0
where the inequality follows because q′ (θ) < 0 for all CRS Cobb-Douglas matching func-
tions. By Lemma 1 and the chain rule, we have that ∂w∂σ =
∂w
∂θ
∂θ
∂σ > 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) We need to establish that ∂θ∂b ,
∂θ
∂ΦV ,
∂θ
∂r ,
∂θ
∂δ and
∂θ
∂χ˜ are all negative. In each case we apply
the implicit function theorem to (24), to obtain ∂θ∂x = −
∂[·]/∂x
∂[·]/∂θ where x is the relevant
parameter, and the derivatives are taken with respect to the right hand side of (24).
It is easy to see that the common denominator ∂[·]∂θ > 0 is positive for all constant
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas matching functions, so it remains to establish that the
numerator
∂[·]
∂x > 0 for all parameters x. We obtain:
∂ [·]
∂b =
σ−β
σ−1
1
1− τL
> 0
∂ [·]
∂ΦV
=
σ−β
σ−1
[
1
(1−β)(1− δ)
(
r + χ
q(θ) + βθ
)]
> 0
∂ [·]
∂r =
σ−β
σ−1
1
(1−β)(1− δ)
ΦV
q(θ) > 0
∂ [·]
∂δ =
σ−β
σ−1
ΦV
1−β
(
1
q(θ)
(1− δ)(1− χ˜)+ (r + χ)
(1− δ)2
+ βθ 1
(1− δ)2
)
> 0
∂ [·]
∂χ˜ =
σ−β
σ−1
1
1−β
ΦV
q(θ) > 0
where the last two equations make use of the definition of the total separation rate as
χ = χ˜+ δ− χ˜δ.
(ii) ∂u∂b ,
∂u
∂ΦV and
∂u
∂r can be shown to be negative by first noting that by part (i)
∂θ
∂x < 0 where
x represents b, ΦV or r. Applying the chain rule and using that ∂u∂θ < 0 by Lemma 1
yields ∂u∂x =
∂u
∂θ
∂θ
∂x < 0.
For ∂u∂χ˜ =
∂u
∂χ
∂χ
∂χ˜ +
∂u
∂θ
∂θ
∂χ˜ we obtain
∂u
∂χ˜ =
f (θ)(1− δ)
[χ + f (θ)]2 +
∂u
∂θ︸︷︷︸
<0
∂θ
∂χ˜︸︷︷︸
<0
> 0
where the last term uses the results of (i) and of Lemma 1.
For ∂u∂δ =
∂u
∂χ
∂χ
∂δ +
∂u
∂θ
∂θ
∂δ we have:
∂u
∂δ =
f (θ) (1− χ˜)
[χ + f (θ)]2 +
∂u
∂θ︸︷︷︸
<0
∂θ
∂δ︸︷︷︸
<0
> 0
where once again the last term uses the results of (i) and of Lemma 1.
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(iii) We are interested in the behavior of ∂β∂θ and
∂u
∂β . First, obtain an expression for
∂β
∂θ by
once again applying the implicit function theorem to (24) to get ∂β∂θ = −
∂[·]/∂θ
∂[·]/∂β where
∂ [·]/∂θ > 0 was established in (i). This leaves
∂ [·]
∂β =
σ−β
σ−1
ΦV
q(θ)
[
(1−β)(1− δ) f (θ)+ (1− δ)(r + χ + β f (θ))
(1−β)2 (1− δ)2
]
−
1
σ−1
[
b
1− τL
+
r + χ + β f (θ)
(1−β)(1− δ) ·
ΦV
q(θ)
]
.
The first term is positive, and on its own would cause ∂β∂θ < 0 and
∂β
∂u > 0 as is standard
in matching models. The second negative term is due to the overhiring/monopoly
coefficient σ−βσ−1 . In the perfect competition limit, the second negative term approaches
zero, so that ∂β∂θ < 0 and
∂β
∂u > 0. For some smaller values of competition, however, it is
possible that ∂[·]∂β < 0.
To establish that a critical value for competition σ˜ exists for which σ > σ˜ implies that
∂[·]
∂β is positive we look for a condition on σ that guarantees that
∂[·]
∂β > 0.
∂[·]
∂β > 0 when-
ever
σ >
b
1−τL +
ΦV
q(θ)
1
(1−δ)(1−β)
[
r+χ+β f (θ)
1−β + β f (θ)
]
ΦV
q(θ)
1
(1−δ)(1−β)
[
r+χ+β f (θ)
(1−β) + f (θ)
] ≡ σ˜. (41)
Hence, when σ > σ˜, then ∂[·]∂β > 0,
∂β
∂θ < 0 and by Lemma 1
∂β
∂u > 0, as is standard in
matching models.
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Appendix B Tables
Table 1: Detailed Entry Costs for 1997
Dataset OECD OECD Djankov, et. al.
Country Days Procedures Index Fees
Australia 5 6.5 12.3 2.1 %
Austria 40 10 35.2 45.4 %
Belgium 30 7 25.6 10.0 %
Denmark 5 2 5.6 1.4 %
Finland 30 7 25.6 1.2 %
France 30 16 39.3 19.7 %
Germany 80 10 55.2 8.5 %
Greece 32.5 28 58.7 48.0 %
Ireland 15 15 30.2 11.4 %
Italy 50 25 62.9 24.7 %
Japan 15 14 28.7 11.4 %
Netherlands 60 9 43.7 19.0 %
Portugal 40 10 35.2 31.3 %
Spain 117.5 17 84.5 12.7 %
Sweden 15 7 18.1 2.5 %
UK 5 4 8.6 0.6 %
United States 7.5 3.5 8.6 1.0 %
The ’Days’ column gives the number of business days necessary to start a new firm,
while the ’Procedures’ column gives the number of entry procedures which new firms
must complete. The ’Index’ column combines the ’Days’ and ’Procedures’ measures as
(days + procedures/(ave procedures/day))/2, so that the indexes’ units are days. The
first two columns draw on 1997 data from Logotech S.A., as reported by the OECD [Fos-
tering Entrepreneurship] and by Pissarides. (2001). The fourth column gives Djankov,
et.al. (2002)’s measure for fees required for entry in 1997, as a percentage of annual per
capita GDP.
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Table 2: Entry Costs in 1978 and 1998
Source→ OECD / Djankov Nicoletti Scarpetta Nicoletti Scarpetta Projected
Units→ Months Index Index Months
Country ↓ 1997 1998 1978 1978
Australia 0.8 1.6 4.5 6.1
UK 0.5 1.0 4.3 5.7
US 0.6 1.4 4.0 5.2
Denmark 0.4 2.9 5.6 8.1
Finland 1.4 2.6 5.6 8.1
Sweden 1.2 2.2 4.5 6.1
Austria 7.1 3.2 5.2 7.3
Belgium 1.3 3.1 5.5 7.9
France 4.2 3.9 6.0 8.8
Germany 3.7 2.4 5.2 7.3
Greece 8.6 5.1 5.7 8.3
Ireland 2.8 4.0 5.7 8.3
Italy 6.0 4.3 5.8 8.4
Japan 2.7 2.9 5.2 7.3
Netherlands 4.4 3.0 5.3 7.5
Portugal 5.4 4.1 5.9 8.6
Spain 5.6 3.2 4.7 6.4
The first column summarizes the entry costs of the previous table, by adding up the
entry delay (as a fraction of a year) and the fees (as a fraction of annual per capita GDP)
and then converting to months by multiplying by 12 to obtain a composite entry cost
measure for 1997. The second and third columns present the product market reguation
indices reported in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000) for 1998 and 1978. The correlation
between the 1997 entry-cost based figures and the 1998 index is 0.78. The final column
takes the 1978 index values and projects them onto entry costs, using the coefficients
obtained from a regression of the 1998 index values onto the 1997 entry costs. This gives
us an estimate of 1978 entry costs.
Table 3: Regression of Entry Costs and Product Market Regulation Index
α0 α1
Estimated coefficient -2.09 1.81
Standard Error 1.22 0.39
t-Statistic -1.71 4.70
Adjusted R2 0.57
Multiple R 0.77
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Table 4: Calibration to US Data
Calibration Targets Traditional Small Surplus
Trend Unemployment Rate (%) 1998 u 5.10 5.10
Monthly Job Finding Rate f 0.45 0.45
Monthly Job Filling Rate q 0.24 0.24
Net Benefit Replacement Rate bb
(1−τL)w
0.30 0.30
Semi-elasticity of unemployment/benefits ξub = ∂ lnu∂b 2.0 14.0
Calibrated Parameters
Vacancy Posting Cost ΦV 0.173 0.025
Unemployment Benefits∗ bb 0.187 0.198
Utility from Home Production/Leisure∗ bh 0.198 0.428
Total Monthly Separation Rate χ 0.024 0.024
Scale of Matching Function s 0.327 0.327
Directly Observable Parameters
Annual Real Interest Rate (%) r 4.0 4.0
Labor Tax Wedge (%) τL 32 32
Monthly Firm Death Probability (%) δ 0.8 0.8
Entry Cost, 1998, (in months of firm’s output) ΦE,98 0.6 0.6
Entry Cost, 1978, (in months of firm’s output) ΦE,78 5.2 5.2
Other Parameters
Worker Bargaining Power β 0.5 0.5
Elasticity of Matching Function η 0.5 0.5
∗ The calibrated values for bh and bb imply that total utility of unemployment b is a fraction of 0.62
and 0.95 of after tax real wages for the two different calibrations, respectively.
Table 5: Baseline Results, Traditional Calibration.
ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978
Unemployment (%) u 5.10 5.26
Unemploy. Duration 1f 2.22 2.30
Vacancy Duration 1q 4.20 4.07
Tightness θ 1.89 1.77
Demand Elasticity σ 8.18 5.72
Markup 1−βσ−1 6.97 10.60
Net wage (1− τL)w 0.622 0.602
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Table 6: Baseline Results, Small Surplus Calibration
ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978
Unemployment (%) u 5.10 7.21
Unemploy. Duration 1f 2.22 3.21
Vacancy Duration 1q 4.20 2.91
Tightness θ 1.89 0.91
Demand Elasticity σ 18.77 8.25
Markup (%) 1−βσ−1 2.81 6.90
Net wage (1− τL)w 0.659 0.635
Table 7: Deregulation without Overhiring
ΦE 1998 ΦE 1978
Unemployment (%) u 5.10 5.25
Unemploy. Duration 1f 2.22 2.29
Vacancy Duration 1q 4.20 4.08
Tightness θ 1.89 1.78
Demand Elasticity σ 11.17 8.48
Markup (%) 1−βσ−1 4.92 6.68
Net wage (1− τL)w 0.605 0.587
Table 8: Interactions with Tax Reform
β98 = 0.05 β98 = 0.30 β98 = 0.50 β98 = 0.70 β98 = 0.95
Tax Rate on Labor in 1978 0.749 0.594 0.566 0.548 0.528
Fraction of ∆u due to Entry Costs: 0.126 0.164 0.189 0.222 0.289
Table 9: Interactions with Worker Bargaining Power
β98 = 0.05 β98 = 0.30 β98 = 0.50 β98 = 0.70 β98 = 0.95
Worker Bargaining Power in 1978 0.122 0.472 0.666 0.818 0.972
Fraction of ∆u due to Entry Costs: 0.069 0.091 0.107 0.130 0.169
Throughout this experiment, η, the unemployment elasticity of the matching function has been held
constant at its baseline value.
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Table 10: Interactions with Matching Efficiency.
β98 = 0.05 β98 = 0.30 β98 = 0.50 β98 = 0.70 β98 = 0.95
Scale of Matching Function in 1978 0.257 0.243 0.241 0.240 0.242
Fraction of ∆u due to Entry Costs: 0.079 0.091 0.101 0.117 0.164
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Table 11: Robustness
With Overhiring Without Overhiring
Increase in % of 98-78 Increase in % of 98-78
u from 98–78 differential u from 98–78 differential
r = 0.01 0.12 5.7 0.11 5.3
r = 0.02 0.13 6.3 0.12 5.8
r = 0.03 0.15 6.9 0.13 6.3
r = 0.04 0.16 7.5 0.14 6.9
r = 0.05 0.17 8.1 0.16 7.4
δ = 0.000 0.04 2.0 0.04 1.9
δ = 0.005 0.11 5.3 0.10 4.9
δ = 0.010 0.19 9.0 0.17 8.2
δ = 0.015 0.27 13.0 0.25 11.7
δ = 0.020 0.37 17.4 0.36 15.6
β = 0.05 0.12 5.5 0.12 5.5
β = 0.30 0.14 6.6 0.13 6.3
β = 0.50 0.16 7.5 0.15 6.9
β = 0.70 0.19 8.9 0.16 7.6
β = 0.95 0.26 12.5 0.21 9.9
η = 0.10 0.15 7.0 0.14 6.6
η = 0.20 0.15 7.1 0.14 6.6
η = 0.30 0.15 7.2 0.14 6.7
η = 0.40 0.15 7.3 0.14 6.8
η = 0.50 0.16 7.5 0.15 6.9
η = 0.60 0.16 7.7 0.15 7.0
η = 0.70 0.17 8.0 0.15 7.2
η = 0.80 0.18 8.6 0.16 7.6
η = 0.90 0.22 10.4 0.18 8.8
ξub = 0.5 0.03 1.6 0.03 1.5
ξub = 2.0 0.16 7.5 0.15 6.9
ξub = 4.0 0.36 16.9 0.32 15.3
ξub = 6.0 0.59 28.2 0.53 25.0
ξub = 8.0 0.87 41.5 0.76 36.2
ξub = 10.0 1.21 57.4 1.04 49.3
f = 0.10 0.13 6.3 0.12 5.8
f = 0.25 0.15 7.0 0.14 6.4
f = 0.40 0.16 7.4 0.14 6.8
f = 0.55 0.16 7.7 0.15 7.1
f = 0.70 0.17 7.9 0.15 7.3
When varying either worker bargaining power, β, or the unemployment elasticity of the matching
function, η, we have kept the other parameter at it’s baseline value, i.e. the Hosios condition has not
been imposed.
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Appendix C Figures
Figure 1: Unemployment Rate and Entry Regulation.
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Source: BLS and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
Figure 2: Evolution of U.S. Labor Market Institutions.
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Source: OECD and Jim Costain’s and Michael Reiter’s webpage:
http://www.econ.upf.es/~reiter/webbcui/bcui.html.
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Figure 3: Entry Regulation and naive Labor Shares.
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Figure 4: Firm Level Equilibrium: Wages and Employment.
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Figure 5: Long Run Equilibrium: Baseline Calibration.
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Figure 6: Long Run Equilibrium: Small Surplus Calibration.
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Figure 7: Quantifying the Overhiring Effect.
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The solid line shows the impact of competition on equilibrium unemployment (or wages). The
dashed line shows how competition affects unemployment (or wages) when the hiring externality
has been shut down by setting σ−βσ = 1.
Figure 8: The Overhiring Effect and Worker Bargaining Power.
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The solid line in each panel shows the impact of competition on equilibrium unemployment. The
dashed lines show how competition affects unemployment when the hiring externality has been shut
down by setting σ−βσ = 1. Throughout this experiment the unemployment elasticity of the matching
function, η, has been kept at it’s baseline value equal to 0.5, i.e. no Hosios condition has been im-
posed.
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